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RECENT DECISIONS
Most jurisdictions which have a code provision of the type relied
upon in the principal case to support the right of intervention do not
regard it as authorizing intervention at all. Rather, they consider it
as providing for the common law practice of bringing in indispensable
or necessary parties, plaintiff or defendant, who have not been joined
by plaintiff's motion, on the court's own initiation, nor upon applica-
tion of the necessary or indispensable party himself.17 Indeed, Wis-
consin, in an earlier decision, 8 has taken a like position, which the
word shall in the statute itself clearly supports. Furthermore, this
state has held that where joinder is optional with the plaintiff, new
parties cannot be brought in under this section.' 9
As the Court says in the White House Milk Co. case, many states
have liberal intervention statutes. These provide substantially that:
"Any person shall be entitled to intervene in an action who
has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both. An intervention takes
place when a third party is permitted to become a party to an
action between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint or by uniting with the
defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or by demand-
ing anything adversely to both the plaintiff and defendant." 20
So also, Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure for the District Courts
provides for liberal intervention. It is intervention of this type which
was unknown at common law but which was derived from civil law,
coming particularly from the Louisiana Code.2'
It would seem that substantial benefit to the Wisconsin procedure
would result if the provision relied upon in the White House Milk
Co. case were confined to the bringing in of necessary and indispens-
able parties, and either the code intervention provision above-quoted
or the provisions of the federal rule were adopted.
MARY ALICE HOHMANN
Property-Joint Tenancy: Special Aspects as to Joint Bank
Accounts- The co-owners of joint bank accounts are ordinarily said
to hold their interest 'as joint tenants. Two recent Wisconsin cases
vene in suit to determine validity or construction of law or governmental
regulations.
17 CLARK, CODE PLEADING §64 (1928).18 Husting Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 192 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833 (1927).
19 Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620, 128 N.W. 439 (1910).
2
0 ALASKA, CoMP. L. §55-3-18 (1949); CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §387 (1949);
IDAHO CODE §5-322 (1948) ; IOWA RULES OF Cxv. PROC., Rules 75, 77 (1950) ;
MINN. STATS. §544.13 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES §93-2826 (1947); NEB. REv.
STAT. §25-328 (1943): NEV. CoMP. L. §8563 (1929); N. D. REv. CODE
§§28-0219, 28-0220 (1943); ORE. ComP. L. §1-316 (1940); S. D. CODE
§33.0413 (1939); WASH. REMINGTON'S REV. CODE §202 (1932).21 Clark, op. cit. supra note 17, at §65.
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suggest special problems in this area when the relation of the owners
is analyzed under the general law of joint tenancy.1
In an action to divest defendant of title to stock certificates held
in joint tenancy, the defendant counterclaimed to compel the plaintiff
to restore her name as joint depositor on certain bank accounts. The
plaintiff's niece, feeling that she was not adequately provided for in
her aunt's will, persuaded the latter to name the defendant niece as a
co-depositor on the bank accounts in question, and to purchase stock
in the joint names of the parties. The aunt kept control of the pass
book, and the niece signed over to her all dividends periodically re-
ceived on the stock. The niece testified that the intent of the parties
was to confer no present interest, but that the niece was to take as
survivor on the death of the aunt. Held: No joint tenancy was created,
though, by inference obiter, the niece's survivorship right would have
been recognized in a contest with the heirs of the aunt. Therefore,
the aunt was entitled to return the account to her sole name during
her lifetime, effectively destroying the survivorship. However, the
court did declare a joint tenancy in the stock. Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis.
2d 300, 84 N.W. 2d 87 (1957).
In the second principal case, the deceased father of the parties to
the action created a joint savings account in his name and the name of
his son. There was no evidence of any declaration by the depositor
or other special circumstance attendant upon the creation of the ac-
count. For three and a half years the father notified no one of his
act; but from time to time he made additional deposits and two with-
drawals, retaining sole possession of the pass book. In his last illness,
he notified his son of the existence of the account, and said the son
might draw on it if necessary to pay the expenses of the illness.
Held: the son, upon death of the father, took sole title to the account
as surviving joint tenant. An account opened in joint names raises a
rebuttable presumption that the creator intended a joint tenancy. The
co-owner will be deemed an agent or trustee of his interest for the
benefit of the creator only if such an intent can be shown by clear
and satisfactory evidence. But, in the absence of such evidence, the
form of the account is sufficient to sustain a judgment for the sur-
vivor as joint tenant. Here, nothing contemporaneous with the open-
ing of the account showed such contrary intent; and acts of the father
subsequent thereto were consistent with joint tenancy. A deposit of
excess funds was built up which could be used for the father if
1 A recent article has throughly analyzed the entire area of joint tenancy, with
special attention paid to joint bank accounts: Cotter, Observation on the Law
of Joint Tenancy in Wisconsin, 39 MARQ. L. REv. 110 (1956) and 40 MARQ.
L. Ray. 92 (1956). It is the purpose of this article to explore only that part of
the field of joint bank accounts that has developed since the publication of
the above article.
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needed, but which otherwise would go to the son on his death. In re
Estate Pfiefer, 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W. 2d 370 (1957).
In the Zander case, the Court seems to have created a new type of
property interest, right of survivorship without present interest. Such
an interest depends upon the intent of the donor, and only pre-
sumptively upon the form of the instrument creating it. This result
seems to violate both the parole evidence rule and the Statute of Wills.
The written evidence of the contract with the bank named both parties
as holders of the account; but the plaintiff was allowed to prove, by
parole, that in fact no interest was given to the other. But, more
basically, the Court sanctioned a form of testamentary disposition
that did not comply with the formalities of the Statute of Wills. The
Court held that the owner of a bank account could retain in herself
all present interest in it; but, by an agreement with the bank, could
name the person to take on her death. This seems to be in direct con-
flict with the former holding in Tucker v. Simrow.2 In that case a
writing directing the bank to pay the account to certain named persons
on the depositor's death, but not naming them as co-owners, was held
to be invalid as an attempted testamentary disposition.
A true joint tenancy has two indispensible characteristics: present
joint interest, and right of survivorship.3 As to bank accounts, the
Court in the Zander case sanctioned the latter without the former. In
earlier cases, the Court had sanctioned the concept of a present joint
interest in a bank account, incumbered with a trust, and presumably
not subject to survivorship. In a contest between the parties, the co-
owner was said to hold his legal title as a trustee for the other, who
was said to have sole equitable title. Thus, in effect, one joint tenant
had the complete interest, and the other a mere power, which he was
under duty to utilize for the benefit of the one with equitable title.
In Plainse v. Engle,4 the father created the savings account in the
name of himself and his daughter, with the sole purpose of enabling
his daughter to care for him in the event of his illness. There was no
intent to give the daughter any beneficial interest in the account. She
drew all the money out of the bank, but was forced to return it to
the father's guardian after he was declared incompetent. Estate of
Stayer,5 in which Wisconsin adopted the contract theory of joint bank
accounts, laid down a similar proposition in dicta. It was approved
in Estate of Hounsel, but held not applicable to the fact situation there.
There have been cases where a true joint tenancy was declared
to exist in a bank account. In Estate of Schley,7 the plaintiff was the
2248 Wis. 143, 21 N.W. 2d 252 (1946).
3 Estate of Gabler, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W. 2d 720 (1953).
S262 Wis. 506, 56 N.W. 2d 89, 57 N.W. 2d 586 (1952).
5 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).6 252 Wis. 138, 31 N.W. 2d 203 (1948).
7271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W. 2d 767 (1955).
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husband of the deceased; the parties had held various savings accounts
and certificates as joint tenants. During her life, the wife withdrew the
money held jointly and deposited some of it in her name or in the
names of herself and others. It was held that the wife, although she
had power to withdraw the funds, did not have the power or right
to appropriate them and thereby destroy her husband's interest therein.
Severing the joint tenancy did not destroy her husband's interest
therein, and the husband was entitled to one-half of the funds which
he could trace to the subsequent deposits. It is significant that,
originally, the particular funds in question were derived from the
wife's separate property. In Boehmer v. Boehmer,8 there was a joint
tenancy between husband and wife. When the husband was declared
incompetent, the savings account was placed in custodia legis, to guard
against either the wife or guardian invading the account to the preju-
dice of the other.
When the contest is between the survivor and the estate, the
principal issue is whether the deposit was made for convenience, or
for the purpose of giving rise to the right of survivorship. If the
Court finds a donative intent, it declares the account to have been
held in joint tenancy, and ordinarily does not inquire whether in fact
a bare "right of survivorship," rather than a true joint tenancy, existed.
However, under the law of joint tenancy, more than an effective
intent to create the joint tenancy is required for the survivor to take
on the death of the other: the joint tenancy must not have been de-
stroyed during the life of the deceased. A joint tenancy can be ter-
minated by the destruction of any one of its unities, since they are
all necessary to its existence.9 Thus, if either of the parties to a
joint bank account, during the lives of both, was to draw out some
of the funds for his exclusive benefit, a severance would be effected
and the incident of survivorship destroyed.:' Consequently, in a con-
test between the survivor and the deceased's estate, whenever a true
joint tenancy in a bank account is found to have been created, it
should also be determined that it continued to exist until the death
of one of the parties, to enable the survivor to take the whole of the
account.
Of course, if the survivor held only a right of survivorship with
no present interest, this would not be necessary. Since the four unities
are never present, the possibility of their destruction is nonexistent.
As the instant case of Zander v. Holly shows, the donor in such a
case can withdraw all or part of the funds for his separate use, since
8 264 Wis. 15, 58 N.W. 2d 411 (1953).
9 Estate of Gabler, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W. 2d 720 (1953); 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §425 (3rd ed. 1939); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.2 (Casner
ed. 1952).
10 Estate of Schley, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W. 2d 767 (1955).
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he holds the complete present interest. In a contest between the sur-
vivor and the deceased donor's estate, most often the facts disclose
a "right of survivorship" with no present beneficial interest,"1 but at
times a true joint tenancy could be found.32  In the instant case of
Estate of Pfiefer, the father made withdrawals during his life. If such
withdrawals were for his spearate benefit, it would seem that under
the law of true joint tenancy, as applied in Estate of S'chley, a severance
would have been effected. The result, in Estate of Pfiefer, would there-
fore have been recovery of one half of the corpus of the account
by the son.
On this basis, the rule of presumption, stated in Estate of Pfiefer,
that:
".. -[A]n account opened in joint names raises a rebuttable
presumption that the creator of such an account intended the
usual rights incident to jointly owned property .. . to attach
to it.'
13
would be better stated:
"An account opened in joint names raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the creator of such an account intended a right of
survivorship to attach to it, with or without a present beneficial
interest, simply as opposed to an account for mere convenience."
If this be the proper interpretation of the Pfiefer rule, then the father
in that case, during his lifetime, was at complete liberty to destroy
the survivorship, in whole or part, by withdrawals.
In the area of joint bank accounts, the Court has departed from
well established property law concepts, and has established special
rules which, so far at least, have been limited in application to bank
accounts. Joint tenancy is defined as a common law estate which is
held by two or more jointly, with an equal right in all to share in the
enjoyment during their lives.'4 Thus the common law requirement of
unity of interest would prohibit one joint tenant from holding a legal
estate and one an equitable estate.' 5 The desirability of applying the
common law unities is questionable; but there can be no doubt that
Wisconsin does not apply them to personal property other than bank
accounts,'6 and to real property.' 7 In personal property other than
"Estate of Skilling, 218 Wis. 574, 260 N.W. 660 (1935); Kelberger v. First
Federal Savings & Loan, 270 Wis. 434, 72 N.W. 2d 257 (1955) ; Schwunke v.
Garlt, 219 Wis. 367, 263 N.W. 176 (1935).
12 Estate of Stayer, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935). Also, the instant case
of Estate of Pfiefer.
13 1 Wis. 2d at 612, 85 N.W. 2d at 372.
14 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy §1 (1947).
15 Wisconsin has never squarely decided the problem, although dicta in Kurowski
v. Retail Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 203 Wis. 644, 234 N.W. 900 (1931),
indicated that a contract by a joint tenant to sell his interest is a severance
in equity.
16 Estate of Gabler, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W. 2d 720, 61 N.W. 2d 823 (1953).
17 Haas v. Haas., 248 Wis. 212, 21 N.W. 398 (1946).
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bank accounts, the Court does not allow one joint tenant to hold as
trustee for the other upon a finding of intent to create the interest
for convenience only. In the Zander case, the intent as to the bank
accounts, and that as to the stock, was the same; but contrary holdings
resulted. Even though the aunt intended to give no joint beneficial
interest in the stock to which she named herself and her niece joint
owners, she could not compel the niece to sign the stock or even the
dividends over to her. A similar position would be reached in regard
to real property,"' since the rules are the same.
Under existing law, as applied to property other than joint bank
accounts, there can be no right of survivorship independent of joint
tenancy. Sec. 230.43 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1955) divides estates
in respect to number and connection of their owners into estates in
severalty, in joint tenancy, and in common. The court has logically
construed this to mean that an estate with an incident of survivorship
can be only a joint tenancy, since in Wisconsin there is no estate by
the entireties.' 9 There was certainly no other type of common law
estate by which survivorship could be established. 0
The requirement of unity of interest would forbid an independent
right of survivorship in a joint tenant without a present interest. The
interest of each must be of the same duration; one could not be a
fee, and the other a remainder.2 1
It is apparent that the Court has placed bank accounts in a
separate category, not explicitly differentiating them from other types
of property, but nevertheless applying concepts to them never applied
to other types of property. In view of the common law and the
statutes, it may be impossible to extend these concepts. There appears
no reason why they should have been applied to bank accounts in the
first instance, since bank accounts are, in fact and in legal theory,
merely personal property.2 2 The special aspects of the deposit contract
will present some problems not elsewhere present, but the property
concpt itself is the same.
23
In addition to creating new types of estates, the Court has also
established new methods of their creation. To establish or change
the legal incidents of property ownership, the law has always required
Is Here there would be an additional reason, the Statute of Uses. Wis. STATS.
§231.03 (1955): "Right of Possession and Profits a Legal Estate. Every per-
son who by virtue of any grant, assignment or devise, now is or hereafter
shall be entitled to the actual possession of lands and the receipt of the rents
and profits thereof, in law or in equity, shall be deemed to have a legal estate
therein of the same quality and duration and subject to the same conditions
as his beneficial interest."
19 Wallace v. St. John, 119 Wis. 585, 97 N.W. 193 (1903).
20 Weber v. Nedin, 210 Wis. 39, 246 N.W. 307, 686 (1933).
212 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §418 (3rd ed. 1939).
22 Estate of Hounsel, 252 Wis. 138 ,31 N.W. 2d 203 (1948).
23 Ibid.
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that certain formalities be observed; transfer of title, like binding
oneself in contract, is primarily a matter of intent; but, for accuracy
and stability of the law, the method of manifesting that intent is pre-
scribed. Proper procedure reduces the danger of fraud and instills
confidence in the law.24  It is for these reasons that we have the
parole evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. Joint tenancy can not
be created in real2 5 or personal 6 property by intent alone without the
proper procedure. To transfer title to real property by gift, delivery
of the property is essential. Bank accounts seem to be the only area
in which no transfer is necessary for a gift. Naming a person as a
co-owner of the account, in the deposit contract with the bank, seems
to be the only formality required; and, as such, takes the place of
delivery.2 7
There appears no reason why the rules relating to the formalities
of delivery could not be applied to the formality of contracting. A
deed can not be delivered to the grantee with parole conditions at-
tached.2 s If the grantor intends to give up control over it, it passes
title according to its terms, any intention of the grantor notwith-
standing. If the grantor wants title to pass on some condition, he
must so state in the deed or deliver it into escrow. The reason is
obvious. If it were possible to prove parole conditions attached to the
formal delivery of a deed, there would be no safety in accepting the
deed, and the formality of delivery would be useless. It would then
be possible to vary the terms of the deed, and hence title would always
be in doubt.30
By contrast, in the principal case of Estate of Pfiefer, there was
only a presumption that a joint tenancy was created by the contract
with the bank. If a contrary intent would have been satisfactorily
proven, the presumption would have been rebutted, and the terms of
the contract, which normally determine the property interest, would
have been varied. The terms of a deed will be reformed by a court
of equity only where there was a definite agreement between the par-
ties, and some term was omitted by mutual mistake or by the wrong-
ful act of one party. An intent by the grantor, contrary to the terms
of the instrument, would not be ground for reformation.2 '
In summary, it is submitted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has established some novel property concepts in relation to joint bank
accounts. The Court has held that an account joint in form can create
24 Auer v. Matthews, 129 Wis. 143, 108 N.W. 45 (1906).232%foe v. Krupke, 255 Wis. 33, 37 N.W. 2d 865 (1949).28 Estate of Gabler, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W. 2d 720, 61 N.W. 2d 823 (1953).
27 Estate of Stayer, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).2 Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 (1872).
29 Lowber v. Connit, 36 Wis. 176 (1874).30 Chaudoir v. Witt, 170 Wis. 556, 170 N.W. 932 (1919).
31 Auer v. Matthews, 129 Wis. 143, 108 N.W. 45 (1906).
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any of three different interests, upon retrospective examination: (1) a
true joint tenancy, (2) a present power, highly perishable, and without
right of survivorship, or (3) a right of survivorship, also highly
perishable, without present interest. Just how great an extension of
these concepts will follow is a matter for speculation. Presently, how-
ever, a transfer of any other sort of property in comparable form
creates either the traditional joint tenancy or no interest at all.
JOHN P. MILLER
